Abstract: This paper is concerned with the regulation of irrigation water via pricing. The main concepts underlying efficient water use are first discussed and then applied in actual practice to demonstrate empirically how readily available data can be used to implement pricing schemes that achieve efficient allocation of water. The policy discussion includes also equity considerations. The empirical findings, however, reveal that water prices have a small effect on income distribution within the farming sector, thereby support the view that water pricing should be designed primarily to increase the efficiency of water use, leaving income distribution considerations to other policy tools.
Introduction
Population growth compounded with rising standards of living has led to a rapid increase in the demand for water. Indeed, by 2025 more than 3 billion people will be living in "water-stressed" countries and by 2050 nearly 1 billion people living in the Middle East and North Africa will have less than 650 m 3 of water per person annually-a sever water shortage by any standard (Gleick, 1992 (Gleick, , 1997 Postel, 1999) .
Because water allocation systems require large initial investments in infrastructure, exhibit increasing returns to scale and involve spatial and temporal externalities, some form of regulation is called for. Consequently, a plethora of mechanisms to allocate water have emerged, some more efficient and some easier to implement than others Dinar, 1998) . Many involve water pricing mechanisms of one sort or another
Methods for pricing irrigation water range from per area, through output and input pricing to various volumetric schemes (see Johansson et al., 2002; , and references they cite). This multiplicity reflects variability in conditions and multiple criteria that underlie water allocation. The main criterion underlying the pricing of any scarce resource is efficiency. However, water pricing is often perceived as a policy intervention that negatively affects poor farmers and small holders. Therefore, the efficiency criteria alone may not always be appropriate. In developing countries, where subsistence farmers rely on irrigation water for basic needs, irrigation water pricing is a sensitive policy intervention. In this work we study efficient pricing of irrigation water and investigate the extent to which the different pricing schemes affect income distribution within the irrigation sector. Our empirical findings corroborate claim that water prices have small effects on income distribution within the farming sector. We thus
focus on efficiency and demonstrate how available data can be used to arrive at a pricing scheme that achieves efficient allocation of water.
The next section briefly summarizes the theory of efficient water pricing.
Section 3 discusses implementation. Section 4 presents three case studies of water pricing in South Africa, Turkey and Morocco. For each case we discuss actual pricing policies in light of the efficiency concepts. Equity considerations are discussed in Morocco only, where the detailed data permits such analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Efficient pricing of irrigation water

Demand
Consider first the case of a single farmer that produces a single crop (y) with a single input, water (q), according to an increasing and strictly concave production function y = f(q). When the prices of water and output are w ($/m 3 , say) and p ($/kg, say), respectively, the farmer's operating profit is 
To incorporated additional inputs, let F(q,z) stand for the agricultural production function with z representing the vector of inputs other than water (fertilizer, pesticide, labor, machinery). Let z(q) be the outcome of
where r is the price vector of z and the prices p, w and r are taken as given hence suppressed as arguments. The above analysis holds with f(q) F(q,z(q) ).
≡
An alternative approach
Suppose that water is provided free of charge but is constrained at the level 
, with λ being the Lagrange multiplier on the water constraint q≤x, the first-order (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for optimum include:
(condition (i)), implying (condition (iii)) that water is used up to the constraint, i.e., This approach is useful because it easily extends to situations involving additional inputs and constraints. Suppose that, in addition to water, crop production involves k inputs z = (z 1 ,z 2 ,…,z k ) that can be purchased at an unlimited quantity at the going market prices r = (r 1 ,r 2 ,…,r k ) and l primary inputs (e.g., land) 
The multiplier λ on the water constraint (q ≤ x) is the shadow price of water, which when calculated for all feasible water levels x, constitutes the inverse derived demand for water.
For nonlinear production functions F(q,z,s), the above constrained optimization constitutes a non-linear programming (NLP) problem. A special case arises when the function F admits the Leontief (fix coefficient) form
for some constants a 1 , a 2 , …, a m . In this case the constrained optimization reduces to a Linear Programming (LP) problem, for which efficient algorithms exist.
As an example, consider the case of m crops and 4 inputs: land, water, labor and fertilizer. An hectare of crop j requires at least a 1j m 3 of water, a 2j days of labor and a 3j kg of fertilizer, and yields y j kg of output, j=1,2,…,m. The parameters y j , a 1j , a 2j and a 3j , j = 1,2,…,m, specify the Leontief production technology. Crop j output in this case is
where q j , z 1j and z 2j are respectively per-hectare water, labor and fertilizer inputs for crop j, and L j is land allocated to crop j. When no input is wasted q j /a 1j = z 1j /a 2j = z 2j /a 3j , and the above implies q j = a 1j y j , z 1j = a 2j y j and z 2j = a 3j y j .
Let r 1 and r 2 be the labor and fertilizer prices, respectively. Excluding water and land costs, the per hectare return for crop j is ) (
Letting L and x denote land and water constraints, respectively, the profit maximization problem entails finding the land allocation water. We will use this procedure below.
Supply
The cost of water supply consists of variable cost (VC) and fixed cost (FC): and will enjoy the operating profit wq s (w) -VC(q s (w)) and the total profit π s (w) = wq s (w)−TC(q s (w)). When w lies below the AC curve, the operating profit is insufficient to cover the fixed cost FC and total profit is negative. In the short run, the fixed cost is a sunk cost (i.e., it must be paid whether or not water is supplied), it pays to continue operation as long as the water proceeds exceed the variable cost (operating profit is positive). In the long run, however, suppliers will have to be compensated to continue operation.
A special case of interest occurs when marginal cost of supply is constant and water supply is restricted not to exceed a capacity limit x, e.g., an irrigation project with a fixed unit cost of supply and limited quantity of water. In this situation, AC is always above MC, so marginal cost pricing always involves a loss to supplier. If demand crosses the capacity limit above the MC level, pricing at the level AC(x) and restricting demand not to exceed x will leave the supplier break even.
Efficient pricing
The total surplus generated by the irrigation water is the sum of farmers and suppliers surpluses. We seek the water price that maximizes total surplus. Given a price w, farmers demand the quantity q(w), satisfying (see above)
and enjoy the surplus The short-run (not including fixed costs) welfare is the sum of the two areas. implying that the operating profit of the water supplier (water proceeds minus variable costs) is insufficient to cover the fixed cost (see discussion above). In the long run, the water supplier will need to be subsidized to stay in business. A question then arises regarding whether water price should be set so as to balance the budget of the water supplier, including the fixed cost. This leads to the consideration of average cost pricing, where the price of water is set at the intersection of the demand and average cost curves. Under such pricing, water proceeds must equal total cost (recall that AC = TC/q). Such a situation is depicted in Figure 2 .2, with the average cost price represented by w # . and farmers much worse off. Moreover, the loss exceeds the gain and the result is a net decrease in welfare.
As noted above, however, when the MC curve lies below the AC curve, water proceeds under MC pricing are insufficient to cover the cost of water supply, implying that some form of (supply) subsidy is required. A subsidy usually comes from public sources, hence tend to distort efficiency as well (e.g., if collected through taxes). Thus, MC pricing preserves efficiency in the irrigation sector but by drawing on public funds may contribute to inefficiency in other sectors. The relative damage of these two types of distortions must be evaluated in each case separately.
We summarize the above in:
• Marginal cost pricing achieves efficient water allocation in the irrigation sector, in that it maximizes the joint surplus of water users (farmers) and water suppliers. If, however, it involves supply subsidy (when the MC curve lies below the AC curve), it can cause inefficiency in other sectors of the economy through its reliance on public money to subsidize water supply.
• Average cost pricing guarantees a balanced budget of the water supply agency, thus relaxes the need to use public funds, but entails an efficiency loss in the irrigation sector (it decreases the joint welfare of farmers and water suppliers). Moreover, the farmers carry most of the burden of the welfare loss.
Block-rate pricing
The MC pricing considered so far consists of a single rate -the MC price w * .
There are variants of MC pricing that contain multiple rates. As long as the water price does not exceed the derived demand for water and the price paid on the last unit is the MC price w * , the demand for water will be q(w * ). Multiple (or block) rate pricing, thus, entails a transfer of wealth between irrigators and water suppliers. It is possible, then, to use block rate pricing to balance the supply budget while retaining the efficient allocation q(w * ). Alternatively, when water suppliers run a positive profit (water proceeds exceed variable and fixed costs), block-rate pricing can be used to transfer wealth from suppliers to farmers by setting the initial prices below the MC price (see Figure 2 .4). Block-rate pricing can be used to transfer wealth between water suppliers and farmers, while retaining efficiency (i.e., a maximal joint surplus of farmers and water suppliers).
Two points are worth noting in the context of block rate pricing. First, block rate pricing must be applied to each farmer (or group of farmers) separately.
Second, block rate pricing involves wealth transfer, hence may have long-run consequences by affecting exit from and entry into the irrigation sector. 1
Empirical considerations
The first step is to obtain the derived demand for irrigation water, which can be done by econometric or programming methods. In the econometric approach, data on water use (and possibly other inputs) and prices are used to estimate the water demand as a function of other inputs and of prices, along the line of the dual approach to production theory (see Fuss and McFadden, 1979) . Alternatively, if input-output data are available, the production technology (the water response function) can be estimated and the derived demand for irrigation water is then obtained via the programming approach.
In the programming approach, the production technology is assumed known and the optimal crop production program is calculated under various resource constraints and the prevailing input-output prices. The shadow price on the water constraint constitutes the marginal value of irrigation water. By calculating the shadow price of water at each level of water constraint, we obtain the derived demand for water (as explained in Section 2).
Here we follow the programming approach and assume a fixed-coefficients 
Case studies
We apply the procedure discussed above to study water pricing in regions of South Africa, Turkey and Morocco. Since these regions vary in almost any respect, they span a wide spectrum of agro-socio-climatic conditions. Comparing these case studies will therefore provide a good basis for policy discussion.
The Loskop Irrigation Scheme in South Africa
The and has a relatively low return, at only R 900 per ton.
Inputs requirements and prices are given in Table 4 .2. Because these crop budgets have been compiled from different sources, not every budget is identical in format. The water cost item, for example, for maize, wheat, groundnuts and cotton includes electricity and maintenance of the irrigation equipment. For tobacco and citrus these cost feature separately and the cost of the water itself is shown.
The total cost of irrigation water supply, including electricity and maintenance, is R21.6 m -3 , of which the unit cost of the water supply is R0.07 m -3
(it does not vary with the quantity of water supply). These data are sufficient to apply the PMP method and obtain a representative farm derived demand for water function, as depicted in Figure 4 .1.1. The variable costs of water supply in Loskop amount to R 1.5 million.
Assuming that variable cost is proportional to the quantity of water supplied (i.e., 
VC(q)
=
Policy comments (i) It is typical in large-scale irrigation projects that the (annually imputed)
fixed cost of water supply is significantly larger than the variable cost (in Loskop, it is more than 6 fold larger). As discussed in Section 2, including the fixed cost in the volumetric price of water leads to average cost (AC) pricing and reduces efficiency (i.e., it decreases the joint surplus of farmers and water suppliers). Moreover, the burden of the welfare loss falls mainly on the farmers.
(ii) Another feature typical in large-scale irrigation projects is constant marginal cost of supply. In such a case, MC pricing implies that the water supplier has no positive surplus that can be used to cover the fixed cost (as explained in Chapter 2, the water proceeds, under MC pricing with a horizontal MC curve, cover only the variable costs). If the supplier is required to operate with a balanced budget, it is recommended that the money to cover the fixed costs will be raised by non-volumetric methods, without affecting farmers' input-output decisions. This can be done, for instance, by a per-area fee.
(iii) There does not seem to be any justification for the volumetric price disparity between crops. Such a disparity practically amounts to subsidizing some crops or taxing others and distort input-output decisions of farmers. Farmers will use water up to the level where its value of marginal productivity just equals the price of water. If water price varies from crop to crop, farmers will tend to grow crops of lower water prices and this distorts economic efficiency.
Farmers will select crops based on the return they get from each crop and other constraints, such as crop rotation, labor or machine availability. But, if efficiency is sought, irrigation water derived from the same source with the same supply cost should have the same price. This rule does not apply for non-volumetric pricing methods such as per-area pricing. In such cases, it is possible to increase efficiency by changing the water fee across crops, as illustrated in .
The Harran Plains Irrigation Scheme in Turkey
The Harran Plains Irrigation Scheme extends south of the city of Sanliurfa billion TL constitutes the net value of water to irrigators.
Policy comments:
The Harran Plains Irrigation District is another example of a (very) largescale irrigation projet with a high fixed investment component (the Sanliurfa Tunnels and convayence facility) and relatively small variable and marginal cost of supply. The huge Ataturk reservoir implies no water scaricty and the conveyance facilities impose no capacity constrains. Thus there are no scarcity or capacity limit components to water pricing and efficiency requires some form of volumetric pricing based on the marginal cost of supply (flat or block rate pricing), and a non-volumetric part to cover fixed costs. The non-volumetric part is captured by the per area prices. The volumetric part is missing, implying a loss of efficiency, as mesured by the joint surplus of farmers and water suppliers (see discussion in Section 2). From the farmers' point of view, once paid, the per area charges are sunk costs; they will therefore demand water up to the level where its marginal productivity equals zero -more than the economically efficient quantity.
However, volumetric pricing entails additional implementation costs (metering, fee collection etc.) and whether or not the gain in efficiency outweighs the added implementation costs needs to be investigated.
The Rmel Drader perimeter in Loukkos, Morocco
The Loukkos basin is located in the northwest part of Morocco, on the Atlantic Within Loukkos we concentrate on a 15,565 ha perimeter called R'melDrader, for which detailed production and cost data are available and arranged in a format suitable for LP application. Applying LP repetitively, while varying the water constraint, yields the derived demand for water (as discussed in Section 2). This was done separately for each of the three farm types -small, medium and large (the only difference between the farm types was the land constraint). In the interest of space, only the derived demand for a medium size farm (15 ha) is presented (Figure 4 .3.1).
Figure 4.3.1
As expected, we observe that smaller farms have steeper (i.e., inelastic) derived demand curves. This observation means that smaller farms are more sensitive to changes in water prices, in that their relative change of surplus is larger.
The reason for that lies in the land restriction, which reduces the flexibility of smaller farms to change their production plans (e.g., crop areas) in response to changes in water price. The relative effect of water prices will therefore be larger on smaller farms. As a result, a change in water price policy may also affect income distribution within the irrigation sector (between groups of different farm size). Below we investigate the magnitude of such an effect and find it to be rather small.
Water pricing: Water authorities control water allocation to farmers and encourage certain cropping patterns, leaving little room for farmers to make their own decisions. These policies stem from the Code des Investissements Agricoles (CIA) -a set of rules regarding public irrigation that was adopted in 1969. The CIA is presented as a contract between farmers and the State, defining rights and duties for large-scale irrigation (LSI) projects. CIA rules pertaining to a public LSI project include:
1. The area of the project is defined and the CIA provisions are to be applied in the delimited area.
2. Land consolidation is conducted by the ORMVA, in order to adapt the size and disposition of farms to rational irrigation. When the plots are small, they are aligned in rectangle, perpendicular to the tertiary canals, in order to optimise the sequence of irrigation and water application. Land consolidation entails setting aside all the land needed for roads, network and drainage. In order to avoid land fragmentation, all transactions on farms of less than 5 ha are prohibited.
3. A cropping pattern is defined, usually with about 20 to 25 percent of irrigated land freely chosen and the other part with a compulsory cropping pattern. The techniques to be used are also defined by the commission that is in charge of cropping pattern. The rational is to optimise water distribution by having the same water requirements and schedule of distribution all over the perimeter.
4. Finally, CIA defines the level of equipment subsidy, the financial participation of farmers to the equipment of the perimeter, the pricing structure and the level of cost recovery.
The cropping pattern was largely defined by the "Self sufficiency objective" of agricultural policy. Sugar and dairy production were prominent in the northern ORMVAs, with an integrated development of agricultural production (irrigated forage, sugar beet and sugar cane), a state provision of inputs (improved dairy cattle, veterinary services, collect centers and extension) and public investment in sugar and dairy factories.
Following the CIA, the price of water in each separate perimeter has 3 components, investment recovery, operating and maintenance, and a minimum consumption charge. The investment recovery component is set to cover 40% of the fixed cost (after deducting the share of other water uses --urban and electricity). 30 % of the recovery charge is proportional to the irrigated area, i.e., a per hectare charge. The remaining 10 percent is included in the volumetric charge. The first five hectares on farms of less than 20 hectares are exempted from this charge.
Operating and maintenance cost is fully covered by the volumetric charge.
The computation of this charge is based on the present value of operating, maintenance and replacement cost, plus 10% of initial investment, and then converted to a per cubic meter of average water flow.
The CIA rule implements water charges progressively in the first 5 (for annual crops) or 10 (for perennial crops) years of irrigation. In addition, discounts of up to 80 % are applied to farmers that divert water directly from the river without using public infrastructure or if the secondary and tertiary canal are not concrete lined, or if the farmer takes responsibility for maintenance of the canal, or if water salinity is to the extent that it reduces yields for the crops foreseen in the mandatory cropping rotation.
A minimum consumption charge applies in LSI to allow for the covering of the fixed part of maintenance and operating cost. This means that each farmer is charged for at least 3000 m 3 /ha, whether or not he uses that amount.
An energy cost charge is added whenever lifting and pressuring is required. The structure of water tariff in the perimeter implemented in 1997 is as follows:
Water tariff structure based on the "Agriculture Investment Code" (Dh m Income distribution within the irrigation sector: Given these surplus measures and the farm distribution data, an income inequality index can be calculated, using any one of the indexes discussed in Tsur and Dinar (1995) . We use the Gini index The Gini index was calculated under a flat rate MC pricing at P mc and two block rate pricing schemes. The numbers show little effect of water pricing on profits and the Gini index G, suggesting that the effect of water prices on income distribution within the irrigation sector is small. This finding supports Tsur and Dinar's (1995) conclusion that water pricing, while very effective in achieving efficient allocation, is ineffective as far as income distribution is concerned.
Policy comments:
(i) The water allocation rules, particularly quota allocation by crops, leave little room for farmers to make their own production plan. The main drawback of such a centralized approach is that it cannot account for individual farms' characteristics such as soil type and farmers' ability, which farmers know quite well but water regulators do not. For this reason it is preferable to avoid inflexible restrictions and let farmers make their own input-output decisions, while pricing water at a level that reflects the cost of water supply and water scarcity. Problems of asymmetric information between irrigators and water policymakers are discussed in Tsur (2000) .
(ii) Farmers are required to cover 40 percent of fixed (investment) costs: 30 % on a per area basis and 10 % as a volumetric charge. How much of the fixed costs to impose on farmers will affect income distribution between farmers and other groups, but will not affect efficiency so long as it is not imposed volumetrically. Pricing (some of) the fixed cost volumetrically involves efficiency implications: the part (10 percent) of the fix costs that is charged volumetrically should be abandoned; it should either be levied on the society at large or, if imposed on farmers, on a per area basis (see Discussion in Section 2).
(iii) Exempting small farms (≤ 20 hectares) from the fixed cost charge is likely motivated by income distribution concerns.
(iv) Covering all O&M costs by the volumetric charge is appropriate when these costs are part of the variable cost of water supply, (see discussion in Section 2).
Concluding Comments
As the competition for water increases, the irrigation sector must manage its shrinking water supplies more efficiently. In this paper we investigate the use of water pricing to achieve this goal. First the underlying theory is discussed and clarified and the ensuing policy recommendations are pointed out. The theory is then 1 applied to three regions, located in three different countries, which vary in almost any respect, including physical and economical conditions and data availability.
The district analyses demonstrate that similar pricing policies may have very different impacts under different conditions, as reflected in the shape (elasticity) of the derived demand for water curves, e.g., the steeper (inelastic) the demand curve the less responsive farmers are to changes in water prices.
In general, farmers' response to water prices depends on a variety of endogenous (crop mix) and exogenous conditions (soil type, water supply reliability; existing water institutions; prices of other inputs and outputs; extension and availability of appropriate technologies; production quotas; access to market and credit). Effective policy interventions should therefore, address these conditions as well.
The ability of farmers to respond to changes in water price depends to a large extent on their capacity to adapt, e.g., by changing technology, crop mix or both. If farmers are restricted to a small set of crops because of agronomic-climatic conditions or lack of know-how due to inappropriate extension services, it will be reflected in the shape of their derived demand. The same applies when farmers are restricted In the case of the Rmel-Drader perimeter of the Loukkos ORMVA in Morocco, the derived demand for irrigation water is affected by the constraint on strawberry production dictated by EU regulations. This constraint implies that only 25% of the water in the perimeter is used for high value crops (strawberry) and the rest for low-value alternatives, which affects the shape of the water derived demand curve. 
